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Is the cloud secure or is chocolate good for you? 
Kate Netkachova and Robin Bloomfield, City University of London and Adelard LLP 
It’s a lovely morning in a university classroom, the early spring sun streams through the windows 
making the atmosphere bright and cheerful. The smell of chocolate is in the air as the students – 
security professionals - are enthusiastically working on their task. It is the first day of the Assurance 
Cases module and they have just been introduced to the concept of Claims, Argument, Evidence 
(CAE) [1][2], which is used to develop complex engineering justifications. However, the engineering 
systems will come later. For now, the students are applying the approach to create a convincing 
argumentation about the chocolate they are eating. 
The task is performed in groups with different teams working on contradictory top claims:  
- Team 1: Chocolate is good for you 
- Team 2: Chocolate is bad for you 
But fear not, both teams are very positive they can demonstrate the truth of their claim. Students 
are actively collaborating to share ideas, split the top claim into subclaims, search the Internet for 
relevant evidence and counter evidence and develop a strong argument supporting the top claim. 
Along the way, they are becoming more fluent in CAE and gaining some initial practical experience in 
creating structured argumentation. 
Finally, it is time to present the results. Both teams have done a great job and come up with a logical 
structured case supported by reliable evidence, such as research studies and scientific papers, 
showing that their top claim is true. The arguments are sound and convincing resulting in a reasoned 
conclusion that each of the top claims is true. 
But how is it possible at all? The two claims are completely opposite yet both can be shown to be 
true. 
That’s the moment when the students can grasp the main focus of this assignment… 
The importance of detail 
The idea of the exercise is for students to recognise, early in the module, the importance of being 
precise about your claims, identify the specific context, environment and all the related details 
before coming to any conclusions. 
With respect to the assignment, the ingredients are important. What is defined as chocolate? How 
much cocoa powder, sugar, saturated fat, soy lecithin, preservatives and other components are we 
looking in? Who is the claim about? The health effect may be very different for someone with 
obesity, diabetes or nut allergy compared to a perfectly healthy individual. What is the amount, are 
we implying it is consumed in moderation? Health benefits can be quickly outweighed by the risks if 
the amount is increased so it is essential to be clear about any assumptions we make. 
For engineering systems this is even more paramount. The decision to trust an engineering system – 
whether to fly in an aircraft, to turn on a power station - can have real world, societal, 
environmental and economic consequences. Engineering arguments have a number of 
characteristics, they are multidisciplinary and science based with mathematical models and 
simulations supporting the justification. The overall confidence in any aspect of the system has to 
take into account a number of details. These range from technical considerations (e.g. to prove that 
the software works as intended) to various social aspects (e.g. whether we can trust the operators) 
and is always a judgement made within a particular organisational context to develop a view of the 
system as whole. 
The context, the environment, the boundaries of the system and other specific details have to be 
clearly defined before any claim can be demonstrated or any important decision made. 
The advent of cyber issues and the increasing sophistication of attackers bring even more challenges 
to the decision making process. A number of analyses need to be performed to address security 
aspects in addition to the traditional techniques used to assure the system and achieve confidence 
in engineering decisions. One approach to dealing with this complexity and taking into account a 
wide range of issues and technical considerations in a structured and rigorous way is assurance 
cases. 
Assurance cases are used for justifying and communicating the trustworthiness of complex systems. 
The definition of an assurance case is: "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing 
and valid argument that a system is adequately dependable for a given application in a given 
environment”. [2] 
Security-informed Assurance Cases 
The module we teach is called Assurance Cases, but it is designed with the focus on cyber-security 
and is delivered within an MSc course in Management of Information Security and Risk. 
Security analysis is frequently seen as a separate activity, with its own standards, regulations, culture 
and engineering. However, there is a growing realisation that security is closely interconnected with 
other properties and should be integrated into the existing analyses rather than performed 
separately. 
In order to create an integrated approach, we have enhanced the existing assurance case 
methodology to analyse and communicate security explicitly [3][4]. In this way, we can have cyber-
security aspects considered with other critical system properties in an integrated manner within a 
security-informed assurance case. 
Developing the approach, we have found that a significant portion of an assurance case will need to 
be changed in the light of security considerations [4]. Incorporating security impacts the design and 
implementation process as well as the assurance, and the approach to verification and validation. 
Some of the most significant considerations from a security perspective involve resilience and 
recovery capabilities of the system, both in response to malicious events that may change in nature 
and scope as the threat environment changes and non-malicious issues occurring during the 
operation. Other important aspects include supply-chain integrity and mitigation of the risks of 
system components being supplied compromised or having egregious vulnerabilities, design changes 
to address user interactions, training, configuration. Addressing software vulnerabilities might lead 
to additional functional requirements for security controls and new policies introduced within the 
organization.  
Assurance cases support the rigorous argumentation. But it should be noted that the judgments in 
cases will not always be purely deductive. Assurance cases are complicated, they will contain 
inductive reasoning and require expert judgement to decide whether they provide sufficient 
confidence in the decision. 
Assurance cases help to develop a wider view of the system and see a bigger picture, as they can 
combine the technical depth with a socio-technical view, analysing human aspects within the 
system, interdependencies, security culture and practices in place. Security-informed show how the 
technical security aspects fit in the broader system context, provide the method to systematically 
explore security issues, analysing their impact and achieving confidence in the security-related 
decisions made. 
Combining security with a wide range of other issues is a complex endeavour and at the heart of this 
task is a full awareness and understanding of hazards. A detailed hazard analysis has to be 
conducted and integrated into the assurance case to become part of the overall decision making 
process. Below we present our approach to conducting such analysis with respect to security. 
Hazops for Security  
A hazard and operability study (Hazop) is a systematic approach to the identification of potential 
hazards and deviations from design and operating intention. It is widely used for industrial safety-
critical system architectures as qualitative technique to identify potential hazards and operability 
problems. 
Security considerations can have a significant impact on the analysis as cyber-issues present 
additional risks to integrity and availability of the system. To bring security into focus, we have 
developed a security-aware Hazop analysis by adapting the traditional Hazop method to explicitly 
address security and extending it with additional interpretation for the guidewords to facilitate the 
identification of security-related hazards. The common guidewords with some examples in a 
computer context are provided in the Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Hazop analysis guidewords with examples 
Guideword Example 
No No message sent 
Invalid Illegal format 
Wrong Wrong data format 
Inconsistent Mismatch between data sets 
As well as Additional message 
Other than 
Wrong message source, 
destination 
Part of Element of message is missing 
 
Prior to performing the analysis, a simplified architecture diagram is created to capture the most 
relevant components and system interfaces. Each interface on the diagram is then systematically 
analysed applying the guidewords above. For security-informed Hazop, the focus is on security-
related causes while other types of (accidental) causes are considered for the full analysis. The 
following aspects needs to be addressed with respect to security: 
 Identify potential attacks 
 Assess if an attack has credible causes 
 Capture any questions arising 
 Explore potential consequences 
 Record any recommendations to prevent cause(s) or reduce consequences 
 Define any actions or follow-up activities needed 
 In practice, the security-informed Hazop analysis is conducted at enhanced multidisciplinary team 
meetings, which bring together the knowledge and expertise of people working on different areas of 
the system. One important aspect of the approach, which makes it very effective, is that the team is 
exploring the field while performing the analysis. As consultants, we explain the method and guide 
the process by facilitating the discussions and capturing all the input. But the main insight is 
provided by the experts in the system and our task is to leverage the experts and assist them in 
identifying security-related hazards and incorporating them into the assurance case. 
This method for performing a security-informed hazard analysis is based on extensive Adelard’s 
experience. We have used it in a number many complex systems and large-scale critical 
infrastructures and has shown to be useful in addressing security threats and assuring systems that 
need to be both safe and secure. This is an active research area and there are other related 
candidate approaches such as STRIDE [5] or cyber-security CMM [6][7] to consider as well. 
Teaching the complex concepts 
As security-informed assurance cases are complicated and rely on other methods and concepts, we 
need to adopt pedagogical approaches to deal with the complexity. The approach we use is a spiral 
learning (Figure 1), where first the basic concepts of the subject are introduced, and then the 
concepts are repeatedly revisited with more details building upon them [8]. Being practitioners 
ourselves, we very much support the idea of "hands-on learning" or "experiential learning", which 
shows that students learn best by doing (these have been extensively supported by the literature 
[9][10][11]. So we introduce various practical activities and workshops at different stages of the 
spiral model. Thus, both theoretical knowledge and practical skills are developed by the end of the 
module. 
 
  
 
Security-informed cases, CAE with Blocks, normal form 
Complex security-informed cases with hazops, links to standards, etc. 
created using tools; reviewing and managing cases 
Tool support for constructing and managing cases 
Confidence in cases, linking to standards, evidence trustworthiness 
Architecting cases: patterns, templates, layers, dealing with complexity 
Hazop analysis, STRIDE, socio-technical  
Basic concepts, Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) 
Figure 1: Spiral model for teaching security-informed assurance cases 
To facilitate students learning, we use the case studies approach, which has been shown to be a 
useful pedagogical tool by a lot of educational research [12]. It is an effective way to involve 
students into the experiential learning cycle [13], expose them to real-world problems increasing 
motivation and interest in the subject. [14] 
We use students’ interest and real world problems to drive the case studies. This year the shared 
interest was cloud security. The students of our module are mature security professionals and many 
of them have worked for organisations that are using various cloud services or have plans to move 
into a cloud in the future. So they are interested to understand whether the cloud solutions are 
secure and assurance cases can be a useful approach to deal with this question. 
Head in the clouds 
Cloud computing is an increasingly growing market. According to the latest report by Gartner [15], 
the worldwide public cloud services market value is projected to be $246.8 billion in 2017. The 
highest growth of 36.8 percent will come from cloud system infrastructure services (IaaS) as their 
adoption becomes increasingly mainstream. The software as a service (SaaS) market will see a 
slightly slower growth and is projected to be up 20.1 percent in 2017 according to Gartner. 
However, even though cloud computing can provide many benefits to organisations, such as greater 
business agility, scalability, flexibility and cost optimisation, information security remains a major 
concern. With cybercrimes being one of the fastest growing economic crimes [16] and digital 
technology driving many of the them, companies are increasingly interested in how to protect their 
data and minimise cyber risks when adopting cloud solutions. 
The most common top claim students initially make is: ‘a certain cloud solution is secure’. However, 
as demonstrated with the chocolate example, such a claim is too broad and too vague for 
meaningful analysis. 
There is no such thing as absolute security. Various details relevant to a particular organisation need 
to be taken into account before any conclusion can be made. For example, the users of the service 
need to be clearly identified, the range of devices, data types and usage patterns analysed. As a 
result, a more specific top claim would probably look like this: 
“The cloud solution A within organisation B provides sufficient level of security for its staff to use for 
corporate data C on devices D.” 
Starting from this top claim, the case will be expanded further to provide a more detailed analysis. 
Students will need to clearly identify the boundaries of the system, specific context and system 
environment, responsibilities and legal obligations, requirements from regulators and other 
stakeholders. They will also need to identify what is considered to be sufficient in this context. 
Security-informed Hazop analysis presented above is at the heart of the assurance case as many of 
the details will emerge while analysing the hazards. The results of the analysis needs to be fully 
integrated into the case with the integration clearly justified to make sure it becomes a proper part 
of the overall decision making process. 
Another issue to address is that evidence has to be clearly distinguished from information. These 
two are often confused by students resulting in problems with the justification. Information can 
contain any data such as text documents, numbers, statistics, but it does not automatically lead to 
any conclusions. Evidence, on the contrary, is very specific, it is only relevant data supporting or 
undermining a claim. In the assurance case it needs to be very clear what exactly each piece of 
evidence is showing and what conclusions it supports. 
Additionally, evidence should not be confused with claims. For example, one common mistake is to 
use SLA as an evidence for the achievement of certain requirements. However, SLAs only provide 
promises, not the actual evidence that the service has been delivered in accordance with the SLA. 
Therefore these should generate claims and require the supporting evidence that the SLAs are 
achieved. 
Unfortunately, there is often a big difficulty for students to obtain the actual evidence documents 
from the manufacturers. Some cloud providers are very generous with the information they provide 
about their services but the actual evidence is hard to find. Oftentimes evidence may only be partial, 
or have restricted viewpoint. But it is still important for students to at least identify the evidence 
that needs to be obtained as this is an important skill in the professional context. 
The overall cases produced by the students at the end of the module are quite detailed: this year’s 
average case contains 93 nodes, with 37 claims, 25 arguments, 27 evidence and 4 other nodes. The 
students used the CAE Blocks approach [17] with some tool support [18] to help them structure their 
cases. On average, a coursework case contained 10 decompositions, 2 substitutions, 2 concretions, 
and 19 evidence incorporation blocks. 
Conclusion 
Going back to the question asked in the title, there is no right answer or one truth for a generic 
question like that. It’s not possible to tell whether a cloud is secure or not, or if a chocolate is good 
or bad. But there are approaches that can help you to define more clearly the decision you are 
making, scope the issue, identify the relevant details, collect evidence, narrow down the options and 
eventually make a decision for particular requirements within a certain context, with specific 
application and environment.  
The claims, argument, evidence (CAE) framework is one such approach that we use and teach to 
students. CAE supports complex decision making processes by providing a method for creating 
structured argumentation. It requires scoping the issues, identifying the detailed claims, collecting 
specific evidence and developing a structured convincing and valid argument to justify the resulting 
decision. 
But there is more to it than just a framework – it’s a whole mindset change. In their evaluation 
reports, students have reported becoming more mindful of claims the make and more conscious 
about statements from others. They are more aware of the need to identify specific evidence, 
question the arguments and go deeper into analysing the issues rather than accepting generic 
claims. 
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